15 - chapter

Freedom of religion

Author: Alar Kilp

Key issues

  • Religious associations opposed the extension of the right to marry to LGBTQ+ persons before the adoption of the law ensuring marriage equality.
  • Religious associations expect the preservation of state protection for religious autonomy following the legalisation of marriage equality.
  • The issue of maintaining the principle of state neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of religious associations (as religious freedom) arose from February 2022 onwards, amid a changed security situation, where government representatives, on several occasions, expected politically loyal positions, particularly from Metropolitan Eugene, the head of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Political and institutional developments

The historically Lutheran-Protestant Estonian society has mostly become distant from religion and church – according to the 2021 census data, 29% of the population identified with some religion, with the largest religions being Orthodox Christianity (16%) and Lutheranism (6%).[1]

In post-independence Estonia, the situation of religious freedom has been generally good – § 40 and § 41 of the Constitution protect freedom of religion and belief, allowing restrictions on the expression of religion and belief for the protection of public order, health, or morals. The Constitution also requires the state to remain neutral and impartial on matters of religion, as there is no state church according to § 40. Estonia has not faced any cases related to religious freedom at the European Court of Human Rights, and the increasing religious diversity has not led to serious legal cases regarding discrimination against religious minorities.

During the state of emergency due to the COVID-19 crisis (from 12 March 2020 to 17 May 2020) and the subsequent special measures implemented by the government, restrictions were also imposed on religious associations. As the government limited the activities of religious associations in accordance with the right granted to the state to limit religious freedom in order to protect everyone’s right to life (§ 16 of the Constitution), the restrictions during that time were in line with the norms for the protection of human rights and freedom of religion.[2]

The main issue in Estonia in 2022, according to a report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)[3], as well as an international report on religious freedom by the United States government[4], and a report by the Freedom House[5], was not deficiencies in religious freedom (which were assessed either with a maximum score or positively) but the lack of marriage equality in family law. The potential threat to equal rights was considered high, particularly due to the sexist, homophobic, or perceivedly extremist-nationalist expressions from the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), especially during their participation in Jüri Ratas’ second government coalition (from April 2019 to January 2021). Separate from political parties, ECRI highlighted documented cases of islamophobia and antisemitism in society.

Similar to four years earlier[6], the Estonian Council of Churches (ECC)[7] presented its proposals to political parties running for the Parliament in the 2023 elections. Among the parties, the Centre Party (which had a dedicated section on “Churches and Congregations” in its programme and the ECC’s expectations regarding the role and activities of churches were reflected the most) and the explicitly Christian-conservative Isamaa most positively aligned with the ECC’s expectations.[8] These two parties were part of Kaja Kallas’ first (Centre Party from January 2021 to July 2022) and second (Isamaa from July 2022 to April 2023) governments, respectively.

In 2019, in its expectations to political parties before the elections, the ECC expressed its wish to enshrine the definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman in the Constitution.[9] In the lead-up to the 2023 elections, the ECC maintained its position that legislation should not blur or undermine the meaning of marriage as “a union between one man and one woman“[10], consequently, proponents of marriage equality perceived a blocking or inhibiting threat from churches when extending the right to marry to LGBTQ+ persons.

The third government of Kaja Kallas, which took office in April 2023 (Reform Party, Social Democratic Party, and Estonia 200), consisted of parties with a more distant relationship to the church[11] and a month after taking office, this government ended the cooperation committee between the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church and the government[12], which had been in place since 1995. Although complete cooperation with churches was not abandoned, active participation of churches in the policymaking process is not favoured.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, which began on 24 February 2022, raised issues related to religious freedom in two phases. The government expected church leaders, especially Metropolitan Eugene, the head of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, to take a clear stance on Russia’s war in Ukraine (March 2022) and later (October 2022) regarding a sentence in Patriarch Kirill’s sermon on September 25, claiming that a Russian soldier dying in battle would be absolved of sins. In both cases, Metropolitan Eugene ultimately did what was expected of him – signed a joint statement condemning Russian aggression issued by the ECC[13] and expressed disagreement[14] with Patriarch Kirill’s statement. However, the representatives of the churches saw in the requirements and expectations of the members of the government (especially the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior) a problem with religious freedom[15] and excessive state interference[16] in the activities of religious associations.

Legislative developments

On 19 June 2023, the Parliament passed the Act Amending the Family Law Act and Related Acts, which the President promulgated on 27 June 2023, and which will enter into force on 1 January 2024.[17] The law granted same-sex couples the right to marry and jointly adopt children.

While ensuring marriage equality for LGBTQ+ couples reduces the fear that religious associations with influence in the public sphere might block equal protection of LGBTQ+ rights, the law does not resolve questions about the balance between human rights and collective freedom of religion, but rather shifts the focus from the level of society to that of the religious associations. The changed legal situation allows for new ways to raise questions about the exceptions to discrimination guaranteed to religious associations, e.g. in the Equal Treatment Act[18] (§ 10), where registered religious associations, when professing and practicing their faith, set their own requirements and rules for couples they marry or professional requirements for people seeking clerical office. For instance, in the Catholic Church, a clergy member who has received the sacrament of holy orders and made a vow of celibacy cannot partake in the sacrament of matrimony.

If previously there were more internal questions within religious associations regarding the religious freedom of their clergy members who supported marriage equality (at that time their position was different from what was established in the national legislation), after the legalisation of marriage equality, the question arises about the protection of the religious freedom of those individuals who, due to their religious beliefs, do not support same-sex marriage.

Although the government and the state have somewhat distanced themselves from religious associations in recent years (in addition to discontinuing the aforementioned cooperation committee, chaplaincy services in the Estonian Defence Forces have been significantly reduced)[19], the principle of state neutrality is still followed[20], according to which, the state cannot take a stance on matters of religious belief within religious associations and must protect the doctrinal autonomy of these associations. Even after the legalisation of marriage equality, the state approves the conclusion of marriage by religious officials in accordance with the requirements that a marriage in the registered religious association must meet. There is still no direct reference to secularism as a constitutional principle in Estonia.[21] Dissent within religious associations is primarily protected by the right to leave the religious association. Doctrinal positions within religious associations are decided internally.

Statistics and surveys

Religiosity in various parts of Estonian society is simultaneously decreasing and increasing. Mainstream culture is becoming more distant from religion – according to the 2021 census data[22] among people aged at least 15, there has been a decline in overall religiosity (in 2011, 54% claimed not to adhere to any religion, whereas in 2021, it was 58%), the number of those identifying as Lutherans (10% in 2011 to 8% in 2021), and religiosity among Estonians specifically (from 19% to 17%). However, during the same period, there has been a growing trend in Orthodoxy (14% and 16%, respectively), the proportion of Catholics (from 0.4% to 0.8%), and the proportion of Muslims (from 0.1% to 0.5%). Religiosity has also increased among Russians living in Estonia (from 51% to 54%).

In hate speech monitoring conducted within the SafeNet project[23], it has been found that religious beliefs are a relatively common target of hostility in Estonian-language social media.

Trends and future outlook

New issues include the right of private schools to teach an interpretation of marriage and family that does not support marriage equality without losing state funding. On 14 June 2023, during the Parliament question time[24], Minister of Education Kristina Kallas confirmed that equal rights for same-sex couples are agreed upon in society, and curricula are based on these agreements, also, all schools must adhere to the national curriculum.

There have also been references to the insufficient emphasis on religious education in Estonian schools. The Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has repeatedly called on Estonian schools to provide more information about the traditions and religion of national minorities in their curricula.[25]

Case description

In Estonia’s religious landscape, there is no religious association that recognises marriage equality. Following the legalisation of marriage equality, one church – the Estonian Methodist Church – took an even clearer negative stance and withdrew from the global United Methodist Church because the latter had started “accepting the marriage of homosexual people and even their ordination to priesthood”.[26] As long as there is no religious association in Estonia that accepts same-sex marriages based on its religious beliefs and teachings, it is impossible for LGBTQ+ persons to find a religious community that would accept them as equal members. How can they then practice collective religious freedom[27] – everyone’s right to „manifest religion or belief, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, in worship, teaching, practice and observance“[28]?

Moreover, a state following the principle of neutrality cannot force religious associations in matters of doctrine. Dissenters within religious associations are protected by the right to leave the association. How, then, can change occur in “this case”? Legitimately, change can come through the reinterpretation of the doctrinal positions of religious associations, and the legalisation of marriage equality has provided a new context for this.

Recommendations

  • In a time when the government and the state distance themselves from religious associations, and mainstream society becomes estranged from the teachings of religious associations, as well as from participation in religious associations and identification with them, it is advisable for the state to adhere to the principle of neutrality, to protect in a balanced way the freedom to believe or not to believe, and also the autonomy of collective religious practice (all of which are European legal norms).
  • The marginal part of religious education in school education also needs to be re-evaluated both from the point of view of valuing religious-cultural diversity and preventing radicalisation, as well as because several religions (Islam, Catholicism, Orthodoxy) are on the rise in different social groups.

[1] Statistikaamet. 2021. Rahvastiku demograafilised ja etnokultuurilised näitajad.

[2] Rohtmets, P., Kiviorg, M. 2020. Priit Rohtmets ja Merilin Kiviorg: usuvabadus – inimõigus või võluvõtmeke, ERR, 23.12.2020.

[3] Euroopa rassismi ja sallimatuse vastu võitlemise komisjon (ECRI). 2022. ECRI aruanne Eesti kohta (kuues seiretsükkel), 29.03.2022.

[4] Ameerika Ühendriikide välisministeerium. 2022. Estonia 2022 International Religious Freedom Report.

[5] Freedom House. 2022. Freedom in the World: Estonia.

[6] Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu. 2018. Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu ettepanekud erakondadele seonduvalt Riigikogu valimistega.

[7] Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu. 2022. EKNI ettepanekud 2023. aasta Riigikogu valimisteks, 22.11.2022.

[8] Kilp, A. 2023. Kallase kolmas valitsus ei saa ilma Eesti 200-ta, Eesti Kirik, 25.01.2023.

[9] Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu. 2018. Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu ettepanekud erakondadele seonduvalt Riigikogu valimistega.

[10] Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu. 2022. EKNI ettepanekud 2023. aasta Riigikogu valimisteks, 22.11.2022.

[11] Viilma, U. 2023. Ristiinimese valimislabürint. Pilk erakondade valimislubadustele, Postimees, 22.02.2023.

[12] Kiisler, I. 2023. Valitsus lõpetas EELK ja valitsuse ühiskomisjoni töö, ERR, 27.05.2023.

[13] Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu. 2022. Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu ja liikmeskirikute juhtide avaldus seoses sõjategevusega Ukrainas ja sõjapõgenike vastuvõtmisega Eestis, 17.03.2022.

[14] ERR. 2022. Metropoliit Eugeni: ma ei jaga patriarh Kirilli sõnu, 12.10.2022.

[15] Remmel, M. 2023. Toward Integrity and Integration of the Church(es) Relating to the State in the Secularized Cultural Context of Estonian Society, Religions 14(3), 398, 15.03.2023.

[16] Viilma, U. 2022. Urmas Viilma: rahu – pidage hoogu!, ERR, 07.10.2022.

[17] Riigi Teataja. 2023. Perekonnaseaduse muutmise ja sellega seonduvalt teiste seaduste muutmise seadus, RT I, 06.07.2023, 6.

[18] Riigi Teataja. 2008. Võrdse kohtlemise seadus, RT I, 22.10.2021, 11.

[19] BNS. 2021. Kirikute Nõukogu: kaplaniteenistuse kaotamine on vastuvõetamatu, Postimees, 20.05.2021.

[20] Kiviorg, M. 2012. Religiooni puudutavate õigusaktide analüüs.

[21] Kiviorg, M. 2015. Religion and the Secular State in Estonia, Madrid: Universidad Complutense Madrid.

[22] Statistikaamet. 2021. Rahvastiku demograafilised ja etnokultuurilised näitajad.

[23] Grossthal, K. 2023. Eestikeelses sotsiaalmeedias vaenatakse enim pagulasi ja seksuaalvähemusi, Eesti Inimõiguste Keskus, 27.06.2023.

[24] XV Riigikogu. 2023. XV Riigikogu, I istungjärk, infotund, 14.06.2023.

[25]  Euroopa Nõukogu rahvusvähemuste kaitse raamkonventsiooni nõuandekomitee. 2022. Viies arvamus Eesti kohta, 03.02.2022.

[26] ERR. 2023. Eesti Metodisti Kirik lahkus LGBT-õiguste pärast üleilmsest kirikust, 21.08.2023.

[27] Kilp, A. 2017. Estonia: Religious Association Restrictions of Same-Sex Couple Religious Rights.

[28] Riigi Teataja. 1996. Inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsioon, RT II 2010, 14, 54.


Author

  • Alar Kilp on võrdleva poliitika lektor Tartu ülikooli Johan Skytte Poliitikauuringute Instituudis. Tema peamised uurimisvaldkonnad on religioon ja poliitika, äärmuslus ja ideoloogiad, väärtuskonfliktid ja moraalipoliitika ning sotsiaalkonstruktivism ja poliitiline sotsioloogia. Alar on teadusprojekti “Rahvuslik identiteet ja Eesti-Venemaa suhted: pikiuuring eliitide ja masside diskursuste kohta” (2021−2025) põhitäitja. Viimased kaks aastat on Alar uurinud riigi ja kiriku suhete seost julgeolekustamise, imperiaalse rahvusluse, poliitilise legitiimsuse ja strateegiliste narratiividega.