Key issues
- The large number of refugees who arrived in Estonia due to the war in Ukraine placed a significant burden on the provision of public services and public goods, including a notably increased responsibility on the Estonian education system.
- Despite this, Estonia’s integration infrastructure – both state governance and social space – has held up quite well.
- The war in Ukraine and the resulting social mini-crises in Estonia once again confirm that integration is not a linear or one-way process that can be taken for granted or managed in a “set it and forget it” mode.
Political and institutional developments
The Estonian integration policy and the situation of national minorities have undoubtedly been most influenced during the reporting period by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. This event has led to several political, institutional, legislative, and overall societal developments in Estonia. The three main ones are outlined below.
Estonia’s integration policy in 2022 and 2023 has been primarily framed by the “Cohesive Estonia Development Plan 2021–2030”, which outlines, among its main goals, the sustainable preservation of the Estonian nation-state and support for social cohesion, integration, and a sense of unity in Estonian society.[1] The development plan is divided into four programmes, with the one more specifically addressing the field of integration included in the programme called “Estonia supporting adaptation and integration”, led by the Ministry of Culture.[2] Broadly speaking, the development plan continues similar activities directed at Estonia’s national minorities as in recent years, therefore, there have been no significant changes in terms of the human rights of national minorities, and the situation can be considered similar to previous periods.
Against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis and in the context of the overarching goals of the Cohesive Estonia Development Plan, in the fall of 2022, a cohesion plan was developed in collaboration between the Ministry of Culture and other relevant ministries. The main objective of this plan was to ensure the stability and coherence of Estonian society in the context of the Ukrainian war, prevent potential conflicts, and foster strong relationships between communities.[3] The plan set four sub-goals for the years 2022–2023: to support a common information and value space, a caring and united state, Estonian-language and -minded education, and community spirit and a sense of unity.[4] However, it is still too early to assess whether and how the implementation of this plan has worked and what impact it has had on the set goals.
As expected, the Ukrainian war intensified most of the usual issues related to the so-called “Russian question” in Estonia: questions about the loyalty of national minorities to the Estonian state, belonging or not belonging to the Estonian-language information space, issues related to citizenship and voting rights, and the transition to Estonian as the language of instruction in Russian-language schools.
One significant institutional development worth noting is the ban on the transmission of Russian federal TV channels in Estonia, implemented by the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (TTJA) in February 2022. One of its objectives was to prevent the spread of misinformation among the Russian-speaking population living in Estonia.[5] The Russian-language information space and the monitoring of Russian TV channels, including the trust or distrust of various media channels among Estonia’s Russian-speaking population, have consistently served as a measure of Estonia’s social integration over the years. Its change has been observed in most integration monitoring studies since as early as the year 2000. Recent developments indicate that Estonia’s Russian-speaking population is increasingly abandoning the viewing of Russian channels, with a decline in trust in that direction, instead, there is a growing shift towards engagement with social media.[6]
Another political and institutional development, also partly accelerated due to the war in Ukraine, was the decision adopted by the Parliament in December 2022 for a complete transition to Estonian-language instruction in Russian-language schools. The transition to Estonian as the language of instruction is planned to take place first in kindergartens and in the 1st and 4th grades during the 2024/2025 academic year, with the final implementation targeted for the beginning of the 2029/2030 academic year.[7] Similar to the transition that concluded in 2011 for the secondary levels of Russian-language schools, this decision sparked broader discussions about the feasibility of such a transition: positive expectations include the anticipation of finally giving up the legacy of the Soviet era and a constant point of contention in Estonian society, the alignment of Estonia’s security and value space[8] and the creation of more equal opportunities for all young people[9]. However, the lack of suitable (Estonian-speaking) teaching staff or insufficient proficiency in Estonian among existing teachers[10], the preparedness of school leadership[11], and potential infringement on human rights[12], among other concerns, are seen as obstacles.
The third development stems from the significant number of refugee children from Ukraine who have entered the Estonian education system. This has substantially increased the workload for teachers, partly due to language barriers between students and teachers, differences in the curricula of Estonia and Ukraine, as well as a shortage of support specialists, among other factors.[13] On the other hand, some concerns have arisen from schools’ ability (or lack thereof) to operate in bilingual and multilingual classrooms – an issue that has been previously highlighted in the readiness of the Estonian teaching staff to instruct students with a migration background or students who speak a different language.[14] Despite these significant challenges, from a human rights perspective, it can still be considered a positive situation, as Estonia has demonstrated a clear willingness and has successfully supported and integrated students from Ukraine to varying degrees within the Estonian education system. As a noteworthy example, the establishment of the Freedom School provides an opportunity for young refugees from Ukraine to acquire primary and secondary education.[15]
Legislative developments
In April 2022, spurred by the war in Ukraine, a draft law proposal (594 SE) was submitted to the Parliament with the aim of abolishing the voting rights of foreigners residing in Estonia (excluding European Union citizens) in local elections.[16] The focus of the draft law was primarily to exclude the voting of Russian and Belarusian citizens living in Estonia in local government elections. Although the draft was not adopted, it sparked significant social debate, including questions about whether it would be in conflict with the Constitution, the extent to which non-citizens should have the right to participate in local governance through elections, and what such a change would mean for Estonia’s Russian-speaking population – such as exclusion from society or direct discrimination based on citizenship.[17] In August 2023, under the leadership of the Ministry of Justice, a draft law plan was completed with the aim of similarly restricting the right of citizens of aggressor states to participate in local elections.[18] However, detailed information about the draft and its underlying impact analysis is not yet publicly available.[19]
Statistics and surveys
The following are notable studies related to the field of integration and national minorities: an analysis of the long-term impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on Estonia in the areas of population and integration (2022)[20], a study on counselling services targeted at international protection applicants and returnees in Estonia (2023)[21], survey results on the satisfaction of Ukrainian students in Estonian schools (2023)[22], a study on the adaptation of a newly immigrated child in Estonian schools and the readiness of schools to become multicultural learning environments (2022)[23], an overview of Estonian migration statistics to enhance understanding in the fields of integration and migration (2023)[24] and the EMN annual report on migration policy (2023).[25]
Promising practices
The performance of Estonian schools in accommodating students from Ukraine is promising and deserving of recognition. Although there were and still are numerous concerns, fears, and challenges, Estonian schools have discovered and developed many effective, functional, and innovative practices for integrating children with different language backgrounds and migration experiences into the school system and the learning process – all without significant external support and across the entire country.
Noteworthy public discussions
The most significant public discussion during the reporting period occurred in August 2022 in connection with the relocation of Soviet war monuments. The focus of this debate was primarily on the relocation of the tank monument in Narva-Jõesuu to the Viimsi War Museum, both before and after the relocation. Opinions were expressed both in favour of removing the tank and leaving it in place. The main supporting arguments argued for the final removal of Soviet monuments and symbols of occupation from public space, thereby protecting the Estonian cultural environment and establishing the authority of the Estonian state in Narva; however, counterarguments warned about the nullification of integration policy, potential condemnation from Russia, destruction and degradation of symbolic values for the Russian-speaking population in Narva, and potential violations of constitutional freedoms.[26] Since the situation after the relocation culminated without major conflicts, it can be inferred that, from the perspective of Estonia’s integration policy, these impacts are likely to be short-term, and from a human rights perspective, the situation did not seem to infringe on the rights of national minorities.
Trends and future outlook
Integration policy is a long-term process with its ups and downs. Despite the transformative events that occurred during the period under review, Estonia has a plan and structure to cope with various challenges. The war in Ukraine demonstrated that Estonia is capable of responding quickly and flexibly to crises in the future, including finding smart and innovative solutions (such as the integration of a large number of students into the education system by Estonian teachers). Therefore, the situation in Estonia’s integration policy during the observed period can be considered positive.
Recommendations
- While it is easy to treat all national minorities as a homogeneous and uniform group in terms of thought and behaviour, the attitudes within different ethnic minority groups often vary significantly. Previous studies, including those conducted after Russia’s recent aggression in Ukraine, clearly indicate that, if not the majority, at least over half of Estonia’s Russian-speaking population holds condemning attitudes towards Russia and considers themselves connected to Estonia. Therefore, it is crucial to consider these differences in various public discussions and policymaking to avoid alienating this significant portion of the population loyal to Estonia.
- The changes in the relations between Estonia’s Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking populations after the war in Ukraine have not been thoroughly researched yet. Since integration or ethnic relations in society occur not only between ethnic Estonians and the non-Estonian population but also within and between various ethnic minority groups, it is important to monitor this dynamic and, if necessary, intervene with conflict management measures.
[1] Kultuuriministeerium, Siseministeerium, Välisministeerium. Sidusa Eesti arengukava 2021–2023.
[2] Kultuuriministeerium. Sidus Eesti: lõimumine, sh kohanemine 2023–2026.
[3] Kultuuriministeerium. 2022. Kultuuriminister: sidususe plaan keskendub eesti keelele ja meelele, 13.10.2022.
[4] Kultuuriministeerium. 2022. 2022 tõi tulemused turbulentsusest hoolimata, 29.12.2022.
[5] Klementi, J. 2023. Muutus aastaga: Vene kanaleid vaadatakse ja usutakse oluliselt vähem, ERR, 09.03.2023.
[6] Mägi, E. et al. 2020. Eesti ühiskonna lõimumise monitooring 2020, Kultuuriministeerium.
[7] Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium. Eestikeelsele haridusele üleminek.
[8] Pärismaa, S. 2022. Enam pole aega ühtsele Eesti koolile üleminekuga viivitada, Õpetajate Leht, 16.09.2022.
[9] ERR. 2022. Riigikogu kiitis heaks eestikeelsele õppele ülemineku, 12.12.2022.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Käosaar, I. 2023. Üleminek eestikeelsele õppele on kui rätsepaülikonna õmblemine, Põhjarannik, 30.03.2023.
[12] ÜRO Inimõiguste Ülemvoliniku Amet (OHCHR). 2023. Estonia: New law banning mother-tongue education for minorities may violate human rights, warn UN experts, 17.08.2023; Lomp, L-E. 2023. Tallinna abilinnapea võrdleb eestikeelsele haridusele üleminekut inimõiguste rikkumisega, Postimees, 17.09.2023.
[13] Kindsiko, E. 2023. Ukraina lapsed Eesti hariduses, Arenguseire Keskus.
[14] Kaldur, K., Pertsjonok, N., Mäe, K., Adamson, A.-K., Khrapunenko, M., Jurkov, K. 2021. Uussisserändajast lapse kohanemine Eesti üldhariduskoolis: Olukord, tugisüsteem ja valmisolek mitmekultuuriliseks õpikeskkonnaks, Balti Uuringute Instituut.
[15] Vabaduse Kool.
[16] Eelnõude infosüsteem. 2022. Kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu (594 SE), 25.04.2022.
[17] Altosaar, A. 2022. Valimisõiguse äravõtmise eelnõu võib saada homme toetust, Postimees, 20.09.2022; Õiguskantsler. 2022. Arvamus kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu (594 SE) kohta, 12.09.2022; Kelomees, H. 2023. Vene kodanikelt valimisõiguse äravõtmise plaan on savijalgadel. See ei saa ilmselt teoks, Eesti Päevaleht, 20.08.2023; Raiste, A. 2022. Vene kodanikelt kohalikel valimistel hääleõiguse äravõtmine on takerdumas, ERR, 25.09.2022.
[18] Kiisler, I. 2023. Minister: Vene kodanike hääletusõigus häirib Eesti rahu ja julgeolekut, ERR, 16.08.2023.
[19] Kook, U. 2023. Justiitsministeerium pani AK-templi Vene kodanike valimisõiguse analüüsile, ERR, 17.08.2023.
[20] Piirits, M. et al. 2022. Vene-Ukraina sõja pikaajalised mõjud Eestile. Rahvastik, lõimumine, väliskaubandus, Arenguseire Keskus.
[21] Kaldur, K. et al. 2023. Rahvusvahelise kaitse taotlejate ja tagasisaadetavate nõustamisteenuse analüüs, Balti Uuringute Instituut.
[22] Peetsalu, E. 2023. Ukraina õpilased Eesti koolis. Õpilaste rahuloluküsitluse analüüs, Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium.
[23] Kaldur, K. et al. 2021. Uussisserändajast lapse kohanemine Eesti üldhariduskoolis: olukord, tugisüsteem ja valmisolek mitmekultuuriliseks õpikeskkonnaks, Balti Uuringute Instituut.
[24] Euroopa rändevõrgustiku (EMN) Eesti kontaktpunkt. 2023. Rändestatistika 2018–2022.
[25] Anniste, K. et al. 2023. Rändepoliitika aastaraport 2023. Euroopa rändevõrgustiku (EMN) Eesti kontaktpunkt.
[26] ERR. 2022. Toom tanki teisaldamisest: kõik integratsiooni pingutused on ära nullitud, 16.08.2022; Kaljulaid, K. 2022. Kersti Kaljulaid: tanki äraviimine integratsiooni vilju ei hävitanud, ERR, 18.08.2022; Taro, K. 2022. Külli Taro: meil saadakse demokraatiast ja vabadusest väga erinevalt aru, ERR, 22.08.2022; Hõbemägi, P. 2022. Kas sai selgeks, et Eesti Vabariigiga ei jamata? Postimees, 17.08.2022.
