Key issues
- Discontinuing all the connections (including doctrinal and canonical) of a religious association with religious centres located outside the country for security considerations.
- The state taking a stance on doctrinal issues calls into question the state’s neutrality towards religious associations.
Political and institutional developments
Freedom House’s 2024 and 2025 reports[1] assess Estonia’s human rights situation to be good and do not highlight problems with religious freedom. Nations in Transit does note a potential threat of political polarisation and a potential threat to social equality rights by EKRE (the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia) and Isamaa, but does not link it to religious freedom.[2]
The issue of marriage equality does remain relevant, although it is rarely discussed in public. Mainstream churches still do not recognise same-sex marriage, and there is no religious association in Estonia that does so. Therefore, it is difficult for same-sex couples to practice collective religious freedom, which includes the right to “manifest ones religion or belief either alone or in community with others, in public or private, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”[3]
A more acute problem arose when the Estonian government and the Riigikogu demanded that the Moscow Patriarchate’s Estonian Orthodox Church (MPEÕK) cut ties with Russia. The reason for that was the program document “The Present and Future of the Russian World”, published on 27 March 2024 by the Global Russian National Assembly established under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church, which declared a “holy war” against Ukraine and the west.[4] The Minister of the Interior announced on 23 April 2024 that MPEÕK must cut ties with Moscow, and on May 6th, the Riigikogu declared the Moscow Patriarchate to be in support of Russian aggression.[5]
In autumn of 2024, the MPEÕK removed references to the Moscow Patriarchate from its statute and asserted administrative independence, but maintained doctrinal ties. The Ministry of the Interior considered the changes insufficient and in October 2024 initiated an amendment to the Churches and Congregations Act (KiKoS)[6], which prohibits churches and congregations operating in Estonia from having ties with a governing body, spiritual centre, religious leader or organisation located abroad that poses a threat to the security, public or constitutional order of Estonia.
The law was passed three times (on April 9th, June 18th and September 17th), but President Alar Karis failed to declare it twice (on April 24th and July 3rd), arguing that it restricts religious freedom and imposes a general prohibition on educational ties, regardless of their actual necessity.[7]
Case law
Following the statement made by the Riigikogu declaring the Moscow Patriarchate a supporter of Russian aggression, the MPEÕK and Pühtitsa Convent filed an appeal with the Tallinn Administrative Court in September 2024, but on 11 March 2025 the Supreme Court rejected it.[8] A similar appeal was also submitted to the European Court of Human Rights, with a reference to Article 9 of the Convention (freedom of religion).[9]
Regarding KiKoS, Tartu’s Bishop Daniel of the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (EKÕK, formerly MPEÕK) made a statement to the UN Human Rights Council on 17 March 2025, claiming that the act violates the rights of believers, since it forces them to renounce canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. He said: “It is impossible for us to renounce the canonical connection, as it is an integral part of our faith. According to the draft legislation, the Estonian Orthodox Church would be responsible for the actions of religious leaders of another country, which is in conflict with the principle of individual responsibility.”[10]
International law expert Merilin Kiviorg has also referred to the OSCE principles[11], according to which states may not attribute illegal acts of individuals or groups to an entire community.[12]
The Estonian Christian Orthodox Church and the Pühtitsa Convent also appealed to the US Commission for International Religious Freedom (on 10 April 2025), and the Switzerland-based NGO Justice pour Tous Internationale (JPTI) filed a complaint with the United Nations (on 14 May 2025), accusing Estonia of violating religious freedom against 170,000 orthodox believers.[13]
Statistics and surveys
In a 2024 survey by Turu-uuringute AS, 24% considered religious freedom an important human right.[14] At the same time, the majority in society favour adoption of the KiKoS. According to a Kantar Emor survey, 59% of respondents wanted the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church to sever all ties with the Russian Orthodox Church (19% were opposed to it). The division of support differed by ethnicity: 75% of Estonians were in favour of severing ties, 8% were opposed to it, while 41% of non-Estonians were opposed to it.[15]
International law expert Merilin Kiviorg emphasises that although, for security reasons, the freedom of assembly (Article 11 of the ECHR) for example, can be restricted – which is why the Ministry of the Interior is also right, which, based on the same article, refutes “lie number 4” on its website, which states: “threat to national security cannot be a basis for restrictions to religious associations”[16], it is not possible to achieve security without protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has also stressed the “state’s obligation to be neutral and impartial in the conduct of religious affairs and the obligation not to interfere in the autonomy of the associations”.[17] The case law of the ECtHR has found that the forced severance of canonical ties or preference of one Orthodox jurisdiction over another may violate these principles.[18]
Noteworthy public discussions
While the public opinion favours the state intervening also in church’s internal affairs for security reasons, the churches themselves are critical of it. Bishop Philippe Jourdan, the Vice President of the Estonian Council of Churches, emphasised in Riigikogu on 18 February 2025 that churches must retain the right to express their teachings without being subject to state sanctions, especially when “church teachings that have been known for centuries are suddenly perceived as a threat to the constitutional or public order of Estonia.”[19]
Concern about the autonomy of the church in doctrinal matters more broadly than in just security and aggression war issues has also been repeatedly expressed by the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church Archbishop Urmas Viilma, who has said on behalf of the churches that “we perceive a threat of interference in the autonomous organisation of the churches”[20], has seen a threat to doctrinal autonomy also where “the doctrinal position that the churches represent may no longer be suitable for the society,”[21] and has raised the question: “does the state have the right to interfere in determining the canonical ties of churches, or does this bring about an infringement or even a violation of religious freedom?”[22]
Trends and outlook
On 18 February 2025, at the session of the Riigikogu Legal Committee, the religious scholars Priit Rohtmets and Tauri Tölpt explained to the legislators that in church history, going against canons has often not been an obstacle, that the stauropegic Pühtitsa Convent has not been in accordance with canons, or that the Patriarchate of Moscow and Constantinople agreed in 1996 on the establishment of two Orthodox churches in Estonia. They also explained who can declare Patriarch Kirill a heretic, and how.[23]
The Minister of the Interior later published an explanatory reply to a letter that Kuremäe Convent sent to the Riigikogu, claiming that “a church’s canonical tie is not a blood bond,” that the Pühtitsa Convent not being in subordination to the local bishop (i.e. the stauropegic status) “is questionable from a canonical perspective,” that canonical punishment does not apply “in the event of an arbitrary departure from the subordination of a bishop spreading false doctrine,” that Patriarch Kirill preaches an ethnophyletist, or heretical doctrine, and “the convent has the right to leave the subordination of Patriarch Kirill preaching heresy, without committing a canonical crime.”[24]
This shows that the state has begun to take positions on issues of church doctrines, whereas religious autonomy and state neutrality used to dominate. As the number of religious practitioners in society is decreasing, public opinion may become increasingly favourable to state intervention in doctrinal and organisational matters of churches.
Case study
In 2024 and 2025, the Estonian state demanded that the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate sever all ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. This meant that the congregation and the believers had to be responsible for political actions of a religious leader in another state, which contradicts the principle of individual guilt. Church members and leaders also felt that the canonical bond, an integral part of their faith and religious identity, was under threat. Assistance was sought from courts and international human rights protection mechanisms (the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council), where it is possible to challenge the proportionality of the restriction and protect the fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Recommendations
- Measures taken by the state in the event of a security threat should not extend to deciding on religious doctrines or theological interpretations. Legislators should more precisely distinguish which relationships pose a real security risk and which fall within the scope of the church’s internal autonomy. This is the way to avoid the situation where a state oversteps the boundaries set by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and calls into question its neutrality.
- A blanket ban, calling to sever all ties with foreign religious centres and leaders may be disproportionate. It is recommended that it is considered in every particular case whether continuing ties pose a threat to national security. In that way, it can be ensured that the restrictions do not breach the fundamental right of believers to follow their religious teachings and do not become a case of collective responsibility.
The article has been supported by the Estonian Research Council grant PRG1052 „Rahvuslik identiteet ja Eesti-Venemaa suhted: pikiuuring eliitide ja masside diskursuste kohta” [National identity and Estonian-Russian relations: a longitudinal study of elite and masse discources] (2021-2025).
[1] Freedom House. Estonia.
[2] Li Bennich-Björkman, Nations in Transit 2024: Estonia.
[3] Riigi Teataja. 1996. Inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsioon, RT II 2010, 14, 54.
[4] Detailne programmdokumendi analüüs on artiklis: Alar Kilp, Jerry G. Pankhurst. 2025. The Mandate of the World Russian People’s Council and the Russian Political Imagination: Scripture, Politics and War. Religions, 16 (4), 466.
[5] ERR, 2024. Riigikogu kuulutas Moskva patriarhaadi Venemaa agressiooni toetavaks institutsiooniks, 06.05.2024.
[6] Riigikogu. Kirikute ja koguduste seaduse muutmise seadus 570 UA.
[7] Riigi Teataja. 2025. Kirikute ja koguduste seaduse muutmise seaduse väljakuulutamata jätmine, RT III, 04.07.2025, 2.
[8] ERR. 2025. Riigikohus ei võtnud MPEÕK-i ja Pühtitsa kloostri kaebust menetlusse. 14.03.2025.
[9] Riigi Teataja. Inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsioon. RT II 2010, 14, 54.
[10] Human Rights Alliance “Church Against Xenophobia and Discrimination”. 2025. Bishop Daniel of Tartu’s Speech during the 58th regular session of the UN Human Rights Council, 17.03.2025.
[11] OSCE. Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security Policy Guidance. Warsaw, 2019, lk 35.
[12] Merilin Kiviorg. 2025. Religioonist, julgeolekust ja seadustest, ERR, 24.04.2025.
[13] Eesti Kristlik Õigeusu Kirik. 2025. EKÕK ja Pühtitsa klooster esitasid avalduse USA rahvusvahelisele usuvabaduse komisjonile, 10.04.2025.
[14] JPTI. Violations of Religious Freedom in Estonia, 14.05.2025.
[15] ERR. 2024. Kolmveerand elanikest leiab, et Eestis järgitakse inimõigusi, 08.12.2024.
[16] ERR. 2024. Uuring: Enamik eestlasi soovib, et MPEÕK katkestaks suhted Moskvaga, 19.10.2024.
[17] Siseministeerium. Kirikute ja koguduste seaduse muudatus, veebis 07.12.2025.
[18] Merilin Kiviorg. 2025. Religioonist, julgeolekust ja seadustest, ERR, 24.04.2025.
[19] European Court of Human Rights. Case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova, 13.12.2001.
[20] Riigikogu. 2025. Riigikogu õiguskomisjoni istungi protokoll nr 67, 18.02.2025.
[21] ERR. 2025. Urmas Viilma: südamerahu saaks kirikute küsimuses tuua riigikohtu otsus, 09.06.2025.
[22] ERR, 2025. Peapiiskop Viilma: kiriku õpetusi ei saa reguleerida paragrahvidega, 21.01.2025.
[23] ERR, 2025. Urmas Viilma: kirikute õiguskindlus ja maandatud julgeolekuoht, 09.04.2025.
[24] Riigikogu. 2025. Riigikogu õiguskomisjoni istungi protokoll nr 67, 18.02.2025.
[25] Mari Tupits. 2025. Siseministeeriumi selgitus Kuremäe kloostri kirja osas Riigikogule, 10.04.2025.
