Key issues
- Attitudes supporting integration are in clear majority among various population groups in Estonia.
- The complete transition to Estonian-language education in Russian-language schools has started.
- Non-citizens were deprived of the right to vote in local government elections, which could have increased tension among ethnic minorities.
Political and institutional developments
Estonia’s integration policy and the situation of national minorities in the period covered by this annual report have most been affected by Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine. This has affected several political, institutional, but also legislative and general societal developments in Estonia.
The implementation of Estonia’s integration policy at the national level in 2024 and 2025 was primarily framed by the “Cohesive Estonian Development Plan 2021–2030” and the implementation of its three programs. The general directions of Estonian integration policy over the past decades have largely been similar – maintaining the sustainability of the Estonian nation-state and supporting the cohesion, integration and sense of belonging of Estonian society, etc.[1] Therefore, activities directed at Estonia’s national minorities, including the new immigrants and the Estonian returnees, have been continued on with, as in recent years.
However, against the backdrop of the Ukrainian war, similar to previous years, most topics related to the usual “Russian issues” have also been intense: the issue of loyalty of national minorities to the Estonian state, belonging or not belonging to the Estonian-language information space, transition to Estonian-language education in Russian-language schools, and the topic of the moment – the right to vote of persons holding Russian citizenship and topics related to the Russian Orthodox Church.
The transition to fully Estonian-language education in Russian-language schools began in the 2024/2025 academic year in 1st and 4th grades, and is intended to be completed by the beginning of the 2029/2030 academic year.[2] The majority of debates on transition has already been held in Estonia over the years[3], so it is now and in future important to assess the effectiveness and the impact of the transition in both the short and long term. Although no comprehensive impact analyses or studies have been carried out yet, various public statements point out relatively good progress of the transition, as well as its shortcomings and problems. The monitoring analysis of the city of Tallinn indicated that the test specifically designed for monitoring transition progress showed results of children studying in transiting schools to be somewhat lower than in Estonian schools, but this difference was not significant.[4] There is also still the problem of achieving B2 Estonian language proficiency for teachers, as is the excessive work load in transition classes due to shortage of teachers.[5]
Legislative developments
Partly political and partly legislative was the 2025 March Riigikogu amendment of the Constitution, which abolished the right to vote of third-country nationals (including Russian citizens) living in Estonia at the 2025 local elections, and as of next elections (in 2029) also the removal of right to vote of stateless people.[6] Reactions to this varied wildly: there were positive ones (reducing the influence of so-called aggressor states, ensuring safety, protecting the democratic rule of law, strengthening the nation state, etc.) as well as negative ones (polarisation of society, securitization of non-Estonian speaking residents, questioning the loyalty of national minorities, feeling of injustice, etc).[7] The short-term, immediate (political) impact of this change is hard to assess even after the 2025 local government elections, but it has been assumed that due to these developments – right to vote, the transition, the Orthodox Church – the Russian-speaking voters consolidated more than expected behind certain parties or electoral alliances.[8] However, this is still a speculation without in-depth research. The long-term (social) impact will hopefully be revealed by future research (the next integration monitoring).
The second amendment potentially affecting the area of integration is the Churches and Congregations draft legislation, which was adopted twice in the Riigikogu and then twice rejected by President Karis.[9,10] The objective formulated in the draft was to prevent exploitation of a religious organisation to incite hatred or violence against another country, nation, religion, or cultural or value space.[11] One of the goals of the draft is to reduce the potential negative influence or hostile influence activities of the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church, or the former Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, on members of the congregation, resulting from the positions of the Moscow Patriarchate (e.g., justification of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, etc.).[12] Similarly to the debates that emerged in relation to amendment of the right to vote, supportive as well as critical arguments have been presented in this discussion. Whether the draft will be adopted and in what form, and what impact it will have on Estonia’s internal security and integration, will be answered by future research.
Statistics and surveys
The more important studies worth mentioning in the field of integration and national minorities are the following: a long-term observation an analysis of integration in Estonian society “Integration Monitoring of the Estonian Society 2023” (published in spring 2024)[13], a study analysing the attitude of persons with undetermined citizenship with focus on their obstacles and motives in wanting or not wanting citizenship of the Republic of Estonia (2025)[14], the analysis mapping the values and narratives of new immigrants in Tallinn (2025)[15], the analysis of the economic impact of foreign students who arrived in Estonia (2025)[16], the analysis of experiences and capacity of NGOs to involve new immigrants, people with different language and cultural backgrounds, and the returnees (2025)[17], the study of recruitment and need for foreign specialists in the Estonian industrial sector (2024)[18], the special report of the Gender Equality and Equal Treatment Commissioner on racial discrimination in Estonia (2024)[19], the analysis of the Global Estonian portal (2024)[20] and the EMN annual report on migration policy (2024)[21].
These two important research series are especially worth mentioning: the Government Office’s Public Opinion Monitoring surveys, and the Integration Monitoring of Estonia (EIM). The Integration Monitoring of Estonia has been conducted regularly since year 2000 and it is one of the most important studies, based on which the main focuses of several Estonian national integration plans and the future outlook have been drawn up. Based on the results of the monitoring, an assessment can also be made of the current state of integration in Estonian society and the long-term development trends. The results of the latest monitoring in 2024 show that integration in Estonian society is entering a new, self-regulatory phase, and that attitudes are overwhelmingly favourable of integration among both Estonians and residents of other nationalities.[22]
In addition to monitoring, the Government Office regularly monitors what is happening in Estonian society and partly in the field of integration via public opinion monitoring surveys (2022‒2025), which among other things, pay special attention to attitudes of the Russian-speaking/not-Estonian-speaking population of Estonia on various topics, such as COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, the importance of Russian media channels, trust in state institutions, sense of security, etc.[23]
Noteworthy public discussions
The most important issues of public discussion are primarily related to the aforementioned topics: transition to Estonian-language education, abolition of the right to vote and other issues of security and internal security (e.g. the Orthodox Church, the so-called Red Monuments Act). In broader understanding of integration of society it is important to note that in many, if not most such discussions, the national minorities living in Estonia are seen in terms of securitization – they are attributed (including the Ukrainians who arrived in Estonia at the beginning of the Ukrainian war) a real threat to Estonia’s (internal) security, and attempts are made to convince the public of this – even if there is no such threat (or the threat is not as serious as it is being presented). It is important to draw attention to this because such (often political) discourse of securitization is carried onto media and through it to people’s everyday lives and attitudes.
Trends and outlook
Integration policy is a long-term process with its ups and downs. Despite the events that took place during the observed period, Estonia has a plan and a rather good systemic approach to facing various challenges.
Similarly to previous years, in the observed period the number of war refugees from Ukraine has placed a burden on provision of public services and public goods, including a more significant responsibility on Estonian education system. Despite this, we can see that Estonia’s integration infrastructure – both governance and social space – has held up quite well.
The war in Ukraine and the resulting social mini-crises in Estonia and other countries confirm once again that integration is not a linear or a one-way process that can be taken for granted or managed in “run and forget” mode. Transition to Estonian-language education, despite the challenge, is definitely the right way to go and will hopefully be completed in the coming decade. Therefore, the situation in Estonia’s integration policy in the observed period can be considered good.
Recommendations
- Keep in mind in various discussions and policy-making that attitudes of national minorities within their own ethnic group often differ significantly, and that at least more than half of Estonia’s Russian-speaking population condemn Russia’s actions and consider themselves tied to Estonia, and take these differences into account in policy-making.
- Most of the challenges in the complete transition to Estonian-language education are already known, but surveys show that parents of other-language-speaking children still have many fears that can and should be addressed with various solutions.
[1] Kultuuriministeerium. 2025. Sidusa Eesti arengukava 2021-2030, veebis 02.06.2025.
[2] Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium. 2025. Eestikeelsele haridusele üleminek, veebis 19.11.2025.
[3] Eesti Inimõiguste Keskus. 2023. Inimõigused Eestis 2024, 11.12.2023.
[4] Tallinna Linn. 2025. Üleminek eestikeelsele õppele Tallinnas: seiretulemused näitavad edusamme ja kitsaskohti, 12.06.2025.
[5] Postimees. 2025. Kristina Kallas: eestikeelsele haridusele üleminekul on olnud mõningaid raskusi, 09.06.2025.
[6] Riigikogu. 2025. Riigikogu võttis vastu valimisõigust piirava põhiseaduse muudatuse, 26.03.2025.
[7] ERR. 2025. Riigikogu liikmed peavad põhiseaduse muutmist ajalooliseks päevaks, 26.03.2025; ERR. 2024. EKRE volikogu: valimisõigus peab olema ainult Eesti kodanike privileeg, 14.12.2024; ERR. 2025. Liia Hänni: põhiseadus ei vaja ideoloogilist muutmist, 17.01.2025; ERR. 2025. Adam Cullen: kas ma olen USA kodanikuna Eestis ohtlik oma kogukonnale?, 29.03.2025; ERR. 2025. Ivan Lavrentjev: integratsioon on läbi, 16.05.2025.
[8] Õhtuleht. 2025. Ühiskonnateadlane Tarmo Jüristo: Reformierakond sai valijatelt noomituse, 20.10.2025.
[9] Riigikogu. 2025. Kirikute ja koguduste seaduse muutmise seadus 570 UA, 27.01.2025.
[10] Vabariigi Presidendi Kantselei. 2025. 591. Kirikute ja koguduste seaduse muutmise seaduse väljakuulutamata jätmine, 03.07.2025.
[11] Ibid.
[12] ERR. 2025. Eelnõu võimaldab lõpetada Moskvale alluva õigeusu kiriku tegevuse Eestis, 08.01.2025; ERR. 2025. Andrei Sõtšov: Moskva patriarhaadi juhtkond Kremli geopoliitika rakkes, 17.09.2025; ERR. 2025. Kaarel Kullamaa: Vene õigeusu kirik on muutunud Vene riigivõimu tööriistaks, 18.02.2025; ERR. 2025. Ringo Ringvee: riik kaitseb usuvabadust ja tagab julgeoleku, 05.02.2025.
[13] Kantar Emor. 2024. Eesti ühiskonna lõimumismonitooring 2023.
[14] Balti Uuringute Instituut. 2025. Määratlemata kodakondsusega elanikud Eestis: hoiakud, identiteet ja takistused kodakondsuse omandamisel.
[15] Balti Uuringute Instituut. 2025. Tallinna sisserändajate väärtusruumid, identiteet ning kohalike teenuste kasutamine.
[16] Eesti Statistikaamet. 2025. Välisüliõpilaste majanduslik mõju.
[17] Praxis Mõttekoda. 2025. Vabaühenduste kogemused ja võimekus
kaasata uussisserändajaid, erineva keele- ja kultuuritaustaga inimesi ning tagasipöördujaid.
[18] Balti Uuringute Instituut. 2024. Work in Estonia tööstussektori välisspetsialistide värbamise ja vajaduse uuring.
[19] Soolise võrdõiguslikkuse ja võrdse kohtlemise volinik. 2024. Rassilise diskrimineerimise kohta Eestis. 2024.
[20] Balti Uuringute Instituut. 2023. Portaali Global Estonian analüüs.
[21] Euroopa Rändevõrgustik Eestis. 2024. Rändepoliitika aastaraport 2024.
[22] Kantar Emor. 2024. Eesti ühiskonna lõimumismonitooring 2023.
[23] Riigikantselei. 2025. Uuringud, veebis 19.11.2025.
