Key issues
- A relatively liberal governance continued, although budget cuts and delays in funding caused uncertainty among NGOs.
- Fundamental rights are consistently sought to be restricted for public safety reasons, and are being restricted, also in illegal ways.
Political and institutional developments
The government lead by Kristen Michal, which took office in the summer of 2024 and continued without the Social Democrats in spring of 2025, did not particularly touch on topics of this chapter in the coalition agreement. Promises related to the NGOs in the last agreement had to do with including more private funding in areas on culture and sports, simplifying the termination of legal entities, and strengthening opportunities for volunteers to contribute to civil protection and crisis preparedness.[1] Specific actions have not yet been taken.
The Network of Estonian Non-Profit Organisations once again, as a part of the 2024 donation campaign, proposed the state make the tax environment more conducive to donating, but for the second decade running these proposals have remained fruitless.[2] In 2025, work continued on the Open Partnership Action Plan[3] for the next period, which, according to NGOs does not appear to be very ambitious.[4]
The question passed through the Chancellor of Justice’s desk as to whether public meetings on private property could be banned, specifically while making election campaigns.[5] The Chancellor of Justice found that owners of shopping centres or markets have this right, although, for example, non-intrusive distribution of flyers and interpersonal communication in semi-public places cannot be prohibited. Nor can a meeting in the immediate vicinity of a property be prohibited, if the meeting is also associated with the owner’s trademark, for example.
On the issue of freedom of association, the Chancellor of Justice found that the obligation to belong to a land improvement association is not in conflict with the constitution.[6] Similarly to an apartment association, the owner of the immovable property also agrees to their membership to manage the common property together.
Legislative developments
The Ministry of the Interior continued the plan to vigorously disassociate the Russian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate, as the latter supports and justifies aggression in Ukraine.[7] However, the president refused to proclaim the amendments to the Churches and Congregations Act in their amended form for the second time already, finding that the overly broad wording disproportionately restricts freedom of association and religion.[8] The legal limit of securitisation of this topic[9] will be determined in the Supreme Court[10], but the issue of church jurisdiction is even more theological for believers, who, among other things seek interpretations from the canon of 861.[11]
The administrative burden was somewhat relieved, as retrospectively, the annual reports of non-profit organisations and foundations for 2024 can now also be simplified, e.g. made without statements of cash-flows and changes in net assets. The obligation to review the report of foundations also increased from 15,000 euros to 1 million euros in turnover or assets, which spares the need of more than a hundred civic foundations to spend their resources on an auditor.[12]
The European Commission changed the pan-European NACE codes, which is why the classification of economic activities (EMTAK) in force in Estonia since 2008 was also changed. The classification regarding NGOs remained largely the same, some outdated descriptions were updated.[13]
The ever ongoing discussions on amending the Political Parties Act did not get anywhere, however, the original plan defining NGOs that influence politics as affiliated organisations of political parties that should be supervised by the Political Party Funding Supervision Committee (ERJK), was abandoned.[14] The ERJK proceedings referred to in the previous report, on whether the activities of the foundation Liberal Citizen (Salk) in sharing its analysis findings with political parties constituted a free service or a prohibited donation, are about to reach hearings in the administrative court in autumn of 2025, as four political parties challenged the injunctions issued them to return to Salk’s “prohibited donations” amounting to one hundred thousand euros. Unusually, the case will be heard in the administrative court by a panel consisting of three members.[15] Meanwhile, the Chancellor of Justice also found that such a prohibition in the Political Parties Act significantly restricts constitutional rights of individuals, as well as the public debate. In addition, she doubted the effectiveness of the prohibition on donations from legal entities, suggesting it be abolished altogether.[16]
Case law
Resolutions were reached at the Supreme Court for the so-called “from the river to the sea” cases where the 120-euro and 160-euro fines imposed by the Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) during a demonstration against deaths of Palestinian civil victims in autumn of 2023 were revoked and the petitioners were compensated nearly 10,000 euros in legal costs. The dispute focused on the question of whether the expression “from the river to the sea” was, from the perspective of an average reasonable person, related to an international crime, where the Criminal Chamber overturned the reasoning of the pages-long semiotic analysis that cost the state nearly 10,000 euros, and the reasoning of the county court.[17]
The legal argument had to do with freedom of expression, but such activism of the PPA clearly has a deterring effect on public meetings when “hobby semiotician police officers” start interpreting symbols unfamiliar to themselves on the spot during demonstrations, or demand prior approval of posters.[18] The cost of arguing with the state also amounts to a significant obstacle.
The Centre Party saw an infringement to its freedom of association when it appealed to the European Court of Human rights after receiving the resolution in the Porto Franco case.[19] Pühtitsa Monastery took the same action, having lost a court case in Estonia regarding the autonomy of the Orthodox Church, as mentioned above.[20]
Statistics and surveys
The European Civic Forum’s 2025 Civic Space Report negatively highlighted budget cuts and delays in funding, the uneven inclusion, and planned amendments to the Law Enforcement Act.[21] The European Commission’s Rule of Law Report found gaps in consistent implementation of principles of open government, and also recommended improving inclusion.[22] According to the monitor of the global NGO umbrella organisation CIVICUS, the openness of Estonia’s civic space fell by three points, to 91 points in 2024, still holding 10th place in the world in terms of openness.[23]
Several studies were completed on involvement of private funding in culture and sports, which, once again, recommended amending the tax system. It is debatable whether the tax environment should support these two areas specifically, or treat all NGOs equally.[24,25]
Promising and good practices
The opaque and corrupt distribution of umbrella funds, which has repeatedly been referred to in earlier annual reports, has been stopped since 2024, or at least it no longer shows up in the state budget and its communication. The expansion of strategic partnerships with NGOs is gradually progressing, for example, since 2025 also in the Ministry of Culture.[26] On the other hand, the partnership competitions of several more experienced ministries were chronically delayed. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications only reached new strategic partnership agreements in the second half of the year. The National Foundation of Civil Society’s international grant rounds also did not open until September. Although costs may be eligible retroactively from the beginning of the year, such long gaps in funding devastate the operational capacity of associations, when partnerships are supposed to increase it instead.
Noteworthy public discussions
Prohibition on stay in the vicinity of farms and burial grounds due to the spread of African swine fever can be considered justified.[27] The latter followed, among other things, strange demonstrations where active citizens set out to defending pigs from being slaughtered[28], and also demanded that the head of the Agricultural and Food Board resign[29]. The phenomenon cannot be considered sincere civic initiative, as organisers appear to be backed by political and conservative forces that instigate protests and spread conspiracy theories also about a number of other topics, such as vaccines, 5G, construction of wind turbines and solar parks, the Nursipalu expansion, Rail Baltic, or minority rights.[30,31]
Trends and outlook
The PPA, similarly to previous years, continued to further ban public meetings in 2024[32] and in 2025[33] around May 9th in Harjumaa and Ida- and Lääne-Virumaa. There were no major incidents of incitement of hatred and supporting aggression.
Case study
The most serious problems are related to the planned amendments to penal and law enforcement policies following the defensive democracy.[34]
In 2024, the Ministry of Justice, with the Ministry of the Interior, published an intention to draft an Act amending the Law Enforcement Act, the drafting of which did not involve interest groups, and sparked criticism on the potential restrictions on public meetings.[35] The possibility of minors to organise meetings was considered a positive, but the possibility of pre-emptive prohibition of meetings by the police prefect, as well as the plan to lower the threshold for the use of water cannons, tasers and rubber bullets was seen as a serious violation of human rights.[36] It has not become a draft act, but the potential risk has become more real with the increasing number of pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the organisers of which have a semiotic axe[37] hanging over them questioning whether they also support the terrorist Hamas or extermination of Jews.
In the autumn of 2025, a working group against anti-Semitism met at the Ministry of the Interior after a long time, after which the minister Igor Taro acknowledged that “recently, anti-Israel demonstrations have stood out,” meaning that at a higher level, support for Palestine is considered anti-Semitism.[38] In light of current circumstances, several examples of manifestations of anti-Semitism in the concept prepared by the Ministry of the Interior in 2021, i.e. before the current active conflict, also seem problematic.[39] For example, the document considers it anti-Semitism to draw parallels between modern Israeli politics and the once-national-socialist policies, even though at least the signs of ethnic cleansing on the Gaza Strip in recent years are unarguably there.
The Ministry of Interior’s wish to make possession and monitoring of terrorist propaganda punishable with the draft intention of the penal code was also creating confusion.[40] The draft intention was opposed by both the Minister of Justice[41] who is from the same political party as the Minister of the Interior, and legal scholars[42], so the draft intention was withdrawn as premature. The draft intention may once again threaten the supporters of factually terrorist-led Palestine, to whom the Estonian Internal Security Service yearbook also refers.[43]
Recommendations
- The PPA should stop bullying protesters by deterring and punishing them.
- Include interest groups and legal scholars in discussions in ministries earlier, when major infringements of fundamental rights are at stake, so that at least the discussion about them is more balanced and does not come as a surprise to everyone.
[1] Vabariigi Valitsus. 2025. Eesti Reformierakonna ja Erakonna Eesti 200 valitsusliidu alusleping, 24.03.2025.
[2] Vabaühenduste Liit. 2024. Pöördumine Vabariigi Valitsuse poole annetamise soodustamise eesmärgil, 04.12.2024.
[3] Riigikantselei. 2025. Avatud valitsemise partnerlus.
[4] Vabaühenduste Liit. 2025. Kvartaliaruanne huvikaitsest 2/2025, 30.06.2025.
[5] Õiguskantsler. 2025. Kogunemisvabadus erakinnistutel asuvates avalikes kohtades, 26.05.2025.
[6] Õiguskantsler. 2024. Maaparandusseaduse § 67 lõike 1 kooskõla põhiseaduse §-ga 48, 19.12.2024.
[7] Siseministeerium. 2024. Kirikute ja koguduste seaduse muudatus.
[8] Riigikogu. 2025. Kirikute ja koguduste seaduse muutmise seadus 570 UA.
[9] Kiviorg, M. ERR. 2025. Merilin Kiviorg: religioonist, julgeolekust ja seadustest, 24.04.2025.
[10] Krjukov, A. ERR. 2025. Karis viis kirikuseaduse riigikohtusse, 03.10.2025.
[11] Tido, A. 2025. Teoloog Kuremäe kloostrile: õigeusu aluseid eiravast Moskvast lahtiütlemine on teie võimuses, Postimees, 05.02.2025.
[12] Riigi Teataja. 2024. Raamatupidamise seaduse muutmise ja sellest tulenevalt teiste seaduste muutmise seadus, RT I, 07.01.2025, 1.
[13] Äriregister. Tegevusala otsing.
[14] Riigikogu. 2025. Erakonnaseaduse ja krediidiasutuse seaduse muutmise seadus 585 SE.
[15] Kook, U. 2025. Erakondade kaebust ERJK ettekirjutuse kohta hakkab arutama kolm kohtunikku, ERR, 28.04.2025.
[16] Õiguskantsler. 2025. Arvamus erakonnaseaduse ja krediidiasutuste seaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu kohta, 03.04.2025.
[17] RKKK. 2025. 4-23-4296/32, 05.03.2025.
[18] Aavik, K. Eesti Päevaleht. 2024. Vandeadvokaat Kalev Aavik: meeleavalduste ennetav keelamine ähvardab tuua kaasa tsensuuri, 09.09.2024.
[19] Krjukov, A. ERR. 2025. Keskerakond kaebab riigikohtu otsuse Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtusse, 14.05.2025.
[20] Õigeusu kirik. 2025. MPEÕK ja Pühtitsa Naisklooster Riigikogu poliitilise avalduse vastu kohtus kaitset ei saanud, 14.03.2025
[21] European Civic Forum. 2025. Civic Space Report 2025.
[22] Euroopa Komisjon. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report.
[23] Civicus. 2024. Monitor.
[24] Ernst&Young. 2024. Eraraha kaasamine kultuuri ja spordi valdkondades. Lõpparuanne, 12.03.2024.
[25] Varblane, U jt. 2025. Eraraha kaasamise tulevik kultuuri- ja spordivaldkonnas. Arenguseire Keskus.
[26] Vabaühenduste Liit. 2024. Strateegiline partnerlus kultuuriministeeriumis, 30.09.2024.
[27] Põllumajandus- ja Toiduamet. 2025. Viibimiskeelud seoses sigade Aafrika katkuga.
[28] Meriküll, V. 2025. „Midagi võtame kindlasti ette!“ Meeleavaldajad pole sigade hukkamise otsusega rahul, Maaleht, 12.08.2025.
[29] Teidla, K. 2025. Meeleavaldajad nõudsid superministeeriumi ees PTA juhi tagasiastumist: asi pole sigades, vaid sigadustes, Delfi, 15.08.2025.
[30] Kuku raadio. 2025. Jüristo: on tekkinud professionaalsed protestijad, keda teema otseselt ei puuduta, Postimees, 30.01.2025.
[31] Laine, M. 2025. Sigade revolutsiooni anatoomia: seakatk tõi kaasa järjekordse hüsteeria ja tapmisähvardused, Maaleht, 13.08.2025.
[32] PPA. 2024. Politsei tuletab meelde: agressiooni toetavad avalikud koosolekud on keelatud, 08.05.2024.
[33] PPA. 2025. Politsei tuletab meelde: agressiooni toetavad koosolekud on keelatud, 30.04.2025.
[34] Saarts, T. 2024. Kaitsedemokraatia militaarses infooaasis – Eesti lähitulevik? Vikerkaar 6/2024.
[35] Eelnõude infosüsteem. 2024. Korrakaitseseaduse muutmise seaduse väljatöötamiskavatsus.
[36] Vabaühenduste Liit. 2024. Vabaühenduste Liidu arvamus korrakaitseseaduse muutmise seaduse väljatöötamiskavatsusele.
[37] Puumeister, O. 2025. Semiootika kui kriitika ja ekspertiis, Vikerkaar 7-8/2025.
[38] Siseministeerium. 2025. Facebooki postitus, 09.09.2025
[39] Ringvee, R. 2021. Antisemitismivastaste meetmete kontseptsioon, Siseministeerium.
[40] Eelnõude infosüsteem. 2025. Karistusseadustiku muutmise seaduse eelnõu väljatöötamiskavatsus.
[41] Alvin, J. 2025. Pakosta ei nõustu siseministeeriumi terrorismipropaganda plaaniga, ERR, 12.09.2025.
[42] Peegel, M. 2025. Eksperdid: siseministeeriumi kava võib tuua kaasa meelsuskontrolli, ERR, 11.09.2025.
[43] Siseministeerium. 2025. Siseminister Taro: võtan tagasi karistusseadustiku muutmise seaduse väljatöötamiskavatsuse, 15.09.2025.
[44] Kaitsepolitseiamet. 2025. Aastaraamat 2024-2025.
